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PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND PRESUMING
DANGEROUSNESS UNDER THE BAIL REFORM
ACT OF 1984
ROBERT S. NATALNIt
A calm dispassionate recognition of the rights of the ac-
cused ... the unfailing faith that there is a treasure, if
you can only find it in the heart of every man ... are the
symbols, which in the treatment of crime and the criminal
mark and measure the stored up strength of a nation.
-Sir Winston Churchill
But till that time you'll here remain,
And bail we will not entertain ....
-W.S. Gilbert, Princess Ida
The Bail Reform Act of 19841 ("Bail Reform Act" or "Act") has
substantially revised the standards and procedures governing bail in the
federal criminal justice system. The Act fundamentally changes the ad-
ministration of bail in the federal criminal justice system by authorizing
"preventive detention" upon a determination by a judge or magistrate
that a defendant presents too great a danger to the community to be
released prior to or during the trial.2
t B.A. 1982, Clark University; J.D. Candidate 1986, University of Pennsylvania.
I Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3041-
3043, 3062, 3141-3150, 3154, 3156, 3731, 3772, 4282 (West 1985)).
2 The term "preventive detention" is an expression commonly used to describe the
pretrial detention authorized by the Bail Reform Act on a showing of the accused's
dangerousness. See, e.g., Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial
Detention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223, 1240 (1969).
Under the Bail Reform Act, a person is deemed dangerous if "no condition or
combination of conditions [that can be placed on release] will reasonably assure ...
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The authorization of preventive detention for reasons of commu-
nity safety marks a severe departure from the policy of prior federal
law,' which imposed bail solely for the purpose of assuring the appear-
ance of the accused at judicial proceedings.4 This revision embodies in
law a significant change in the national judgment of the proper accom-
modation of the rights of the criminally accused with the interest of all
persons in being safe and secure in their lives and property.5
The constitutionality of preventive detention has been hotly de-
bated over the past two decades,' but the Supreme Court has never
explicitly decided the issue.7 This Comment will not attempt to review
the safety of any other person and the community." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(e) (West
1985). See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3183, 3195. The term "dangerousness" is used throughout
this Comment to refer to this concept.
3 See Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1982), repealed by Bail
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). Because the section
numbers of the old and new laws as codified are similar, references to the Bail Reform
Act of 1966 will be explicitly designated to avoid confusion.
4 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 3. Under The Bail Reform Act of 1984,
the purposes of bail still include assuring the appearance of the accused at trial. Condi-
tions can be imposed upon release to ensure that she appears for judicial proceedings.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(c) (West 1985). If no conditions are found to be sufficient to
ensure appearance at trial, the accused may be detained. See id. § 3142(d), (e). Prior
law provided for the consideration of danger to the community only in capital cases. See
Ball Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1982), repealed by Bail Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
5 In S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, the Judiciary Committee of the Senate stated:
The decision to provide for pretrial detention is in no way a derogation of
the defendant's interest in remaining at liberty prior to trial. However, not
only the interests of the defendant, but also important societal interests are
at issue in the pretrial release decision. Where there is a strong probability
that a person will commit additional crimes if released, the need to protect
the community becomes sufficiently compelling that detention, on balance,
is appropriate.
Id. at 7.
This argument contrasts sharply with the view of the "public interest" expressed
by Congress in 1966. The stated purpose of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 was "to
assure that all persons ... shall not be needlessly detained pending their appearance
to answer charges ...when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public
interest." 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1982), repealed by Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). Detention of a defendant prior to trial based on a predic-
tion of future dangerous behavior apparently was considered not to serve the ends of
justice or the public interest. It was not authorized by the 1966 Act.
6 Compare Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (pt. 1), 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 959 (1965) and Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the
World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371 (1970) (arguing that there is a constitu-
tional right to bail) with Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L.
REv. 33 (1977) and Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention (pt. 1), 60 GEO.
L.J. 1139 (1972) (arguing that there is no constitutional right to bail).
7 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 n.15 (1979) (reserving the question
whether any governmental objectives besides guaranteeing an accused's presence at trial
may constitutionally justify pretrial detention). Other cases addressing the issue are
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that debate or address the question whether a person can ever constitu-
tionally be detained based on a prediction of dangerousness;' rather, it
will evaluate the procedures by which a person is determined to be
dangerous under the Bail Reform Act.
Specifically, this Comment will address the constitutionality of the
Bail Reform Act's two presumptions of dangerousness. The Act states
that under certain circumstances a presumption arises that no condi-
tions placed on the release of the accused will reasonably assure the
safety of the community.9 It then falls upon the accused to rebut the
presumption of dangerousness in order to obtain her freedom before
trial. If she cannot rebut the presumption, the judicial officer must or-
der pretrial detention. 0
Part I of the Comment discusses the two presumptions in the con-
text of the overall procedural requirements of the Bail Reform Act.
Part II describes the role of the burden of proof in the factfinding pro-
cess and the effect of presumptions on the placement of that burden. As
this general conceptual framework is outlined, Part II also gives content
to the vague language in the statute and legislative history describing
the operation of the presumptions in allocating the burden of proof in
the dangerousness determination. Part III describes the due process
standards for the use of presumptions in criminal prosecutions, and
Part IV argues that the same procedural protections are constitutionally
required in the pretrial detention hearing. Finally, Part V analyzes the
constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act presumptions when measured
by these standards. The Comment concludes that preventive detention
resulting from a process in which the accused is presumed to be dan-
contradictory and inconclusive. Compare Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537-42
(1952) (holding that national security concerns justify detaining aliens who have been
arrested for deportation) with Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1951) (holding excessive
bail unconstitutional when based solely on government's allegation that accused would
flee, without any hearing on the issue). The Court recently held, however, that a New
York State statute authorizing pretrial detention of juveniles determined to be danger-
ous is constitutional. See Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984). The decision in
Schall, however, was in part based on the state's ability to detain juveniles pursuant to
its parens patriae interest. See id. at 2410-11. This reasoning is solely applicable to the
detention of juveniles, and therefore Schall is not dispositive of the issue generally.
8 This Comment assumes that a prediction of dangerousness can, with proper pro-
cedural safeguards, be a basis for pretrial detention.
" See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(e) (West 1985). Several courts of appeals have already
confronted the question of the constitutionality of the presumptions. The First Circuit
held that the presumption that an accused will flee is constitutional because it only
shifts the burden of production and is supported by "substantial evidence." See United
States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 385-87 (1st Cir. 1985). Two circuits have expressly
reserved the question. See United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 1985).
0 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(e) (West 1985).
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gerous and bears the burden of rebutting that presumption is a depriva-
tion of liberty without due process of law, and thus violates the fifth
amendment of the Constitution."1
I. PROCEDURES UNDER THE BAIL REFORM ACT
A. The Pretrial Detention Hearing
Under the Bail Reform Act, a judicial officer who is authorized to
order an arrest 2 may order that an arrested person be detained pend-
ing judicial proceedings.' 3 The person may be detained prior to trial if
the judicial officer determines after a detention hearing that "no condi-
tion or combination of conditions [placed upon pretrial release] will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the
safety of any other person and the community .... ""
A detention hearing must be held, upon the motion of the attorney
for the government, in cases in which the defendant is charged with a
crime of violence,' an offense punishable by death or life imprison-
ment,'8 a major drug trafficking offense,"1 or any felony if the person
has previously been convicted of two or more of the offenses described
above.' s Additionally, a hearing must be held, upon the motion of the
government or upon the court's own motion, in cases that involve a
11 "[No person shall] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
12 A person may be ordered arrested and detained for any offense against the
United States "by any justice or judge of the United States, or by any United States
magistrate, or by any chancellor, judge of a supreme or superior court, chief or first
judge of common pleas, mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any
state where the offender may be found . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 3041 (1982).
3 See id. § 3141(a).
14 Id. § 3142(e). The conditions that may be placed on pretrial release in order to
assure the appearance of the accused and the safety of the community are delineated in
id. § 3142(c).
15 Id. § 3142(f)(1)(A).
16 Id. § 3142(f)(1)(B).
17 Id. § 3142(f)(1)(C). Specifically, these include offenses punishable by impris-
onment for ten years or more under the Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21 & 42
U.S.C.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1285 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 26, 28, 31, 40, 42,
46 & 49 U.S.C.), or section 1 of the Act of September 15, 1980, 21 U.S.C. § 955(a)
(1982) (manufacture or distribution of drugs on board vessels). See 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3142(f)(1)(C) (West 1985).
a 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(f)(1)(D). This section also applies if the defendant has
twice previously been convicted of state or local offenses that would have been offenses
described in this paragraph "if a circumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had
existed . . . ." Id.
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serious risk that the person will either flee,"9 obstruct justice, "or at-
tempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or ju-
ror."' 20 Because detention may be ordered only after a hearing, these
requirements for invoking the detention hearing serve to limit the types
of cases in which detention may be ordered prior to trial.
B. Due Process Protections at the Detention Hearing
A number of procedural requirements apply at the pretrial deten-
tion hearing that are intended to protect the right of the accused against
deprivation of liberty without due process of law.2" The person has the
right to be represented by counsel, and the right to have counsel ap-
pointed if she is financially unable to obtain representation. 22 The ac-
cused may testify, present and cross-examine witnesses, and present in-
formation on the issue of dangerousness.2"
Finally, the facts the judicial officer uses to support a finding "that
no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
safety of any other person and the community [must] be supported by
clear and convincing evidence." 2' In making this determination, the ju-
dicial officer is directed to take into account the nature and circum-
stances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against the
person, the history and characteristics of the person, and the nature and
seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would
be posed by the person's release. 25
11 Id. § 3142(f)(2)(A).
20 Id. § 3142(f)(2)(B). In this subparagraph, the Bail Reform Act codifies ex-
isting case law authorizing detention for the purpose of preserving the integrity of the
judicial system and protecting prospective witnesses and jurors. See, e.g, United States
v. Wind, 527 F.2d 672, 675 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Gilbert, 425 F.2d 490,
491-92 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (N.D. Cal.
1985) (citing Gilbert and Wind to support the notion that bail may be denied when
societal interests such as the protection of jurors or witnesses are at stake). In cases in
which a detention hearing is held upon the motion of the court because the judicial
officer perceives that these "serious risks" exist, it seems quite likely that the issue has
been decided before the hearing is even held.
21 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 8.
[While] pretrial detention is not per se unconstitutional . . . a pretrial
detention statute may nonetheless be constitutionally defective if it falls to
provide adequate procedural safeguards or if it does not limit pretrial de-
tention to cases in which it is necessary to serve the societal interests it is
designed to protect.
Id.
22 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(f) (West 1985).
23 See id. "The rules concerning admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do not
apply to the presentation and consideration of information at the hearing." Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. § 3142(g)(1)-(4).
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C. The Presumptions of Dangerousness-Section 3142(e)
There are two rebuttable presumptions in the Bail Reform Act.
The first presumption, that "no condition or combination of conditions
will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the commu-
nity,"" arises in cases where the accused has been charged with, and
has previously been convicted of, one of a number of specified of-
fenses,27 and the previous offense was committed while on pretrial re-
lease.2 In addition, "not more than five years [may have] elapsed since
the date of conviction, or release from imprisonment," for the previous
offense.29
The second rebuttable presumption, similar to the first, presumes
"that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the commu-
nity."' This presumption arises if the judicial officer finds there is
probable cause to believe that the accused has committed a major drug
trafficking offense" or a felony with a firearm.32 Because these pre-
sumptions at the very least shift to the accused the burden of producing
3B Id. § 3142(e).
2 See id. § 3142(e)(1). The offenses specified are:
(A) a crime of violence;
(B) an offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or
death;
(C) an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or
more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act [Pub. L. No. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21
& 42 U.S.C.)], the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act [Pub. L.
No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1285 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 21, 26, 28, 31, 40, 42, 46 & 49 U.S.C.)], or section 1 of the Act of
September 15, 1980 [21 U.S.C. § 955(a) (1982)]; or
(D) any felony committed after the person had been convicted of two or
more prior offenses described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) if a cir-
cumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed ... "
18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(0(1) (West 1985) (citations omitted).
18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(e)(2) (West 1985).
'9 Id. § 3142(e)(3).
SO Id. § 3142(e). This presumption is concerned with predicting appearance at
trial as well as dangerousness. This Comment limits its focus to predictions of danger-
ousness only, although the discussion may be relevant to predicting flight risk as well.
"1 Id. The offense must be one "for which a maximum term of imprisonment of
ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act [Pub. L. No. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21 & 42 U.S.C.)],
the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act [Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.,1285
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 26, 28, 31, 40, 42, 46 & 49
U.S.C.)], [or] section 1 of the Act of September 15, 1980 [21 U.S.C. § 955(a)
(1982)] . . . ." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(e) (West 1985) (citations omitted).
2 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(e) (West 1985). This subparagraph refers to offenses
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1982), which deals with felonies committed with a firearm.
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evidence of nondangerousness, 3 they have a severe impact on the hear-
ing procedure.
II. PRESUMPTIONS AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Few legal terms have caused as much confusion as the terms "bur-
den of proof" and "presumption." ' Yet Congress gave virtually no
consideration and has provided no guidance as to the meaning or appli-
cation of the presumptions in the Bail Reform Act. 5 Given the high
cost to the individual of a deprivation of liberty prior to an adjudication
of guilt, 8 it is imperative that the use of presumptions at the detention
hearing not lead to unwarranted incarceration.
The presumptions of the Bail Reform Act affect the factfinding
process by allocating the burden of proof. In order to appreciate how
the presumptions of section 3142(e) affect the determination of whether
a person is dangerous, it is necessary to understand how presumptions
and the allocation of the burden of proof affect factfinding processes
generally, as well as how the burden of proof is allocated under the
Bail Reform Act in cases in which the presumptions do not arise.3
A. The Burden of Proof
The term "burden of proof" includes two separate burdens. One
31 See infra notes 71-89 and accompanying text.
3" See, e.g, E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 344, at 965 (3d ed. 1984)
("One ventures the assertion that 'presumption' is the slipperiest member of the family
of legal terms, except its first cousin, 'burden of proof.' ") [hereinafter cited as McCoR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE]; Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the
Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 307, 307-08 (1920) ("[There is no class of case
more confused or confusing, more difficult to analyze or rationalise than those which
deal with the effect of presumptions on the burden of proof."); Laughlin, In Support of
the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REv. 195, 196-207 (1953) (describ-
ing eight ways the term presumption has been used by the courts).
35 See infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
S6 See infra notes 123-39 and accompanying text.
37 The law of burdens of proof and presumptions has developed as part of the law
of evidence at trial, and a major concern has been the proper roles of the judge and
jury. Obviously, the detention determination is not made pursuant to a trial. The judi-
cial officer is both judge, making findings of law, and jury, making findings of fact.
The rules of procedure established for trials, such as the rules governing admissibility
of evidence, do not apply at the detention hearing. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(f) (West
1985). Like a trial, however, the detention hearing functions as a procedural device for
determining the existence of certain facts (for example, whether the accused is danger-
ous or likely to flee). Thus, the logical process of inference of the existence of one fact
from proof of another operates in a pretrial hearing as in any fact-finding procedure.
Moreover, trial judges, like the judicial officers in the pretrial hearing, often serve as
both trier of fact and law. For these reasons, the operation of presumptions at trial
should also be applicable at the detention hearing.
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burden, commonly known as the "burden of production," is that of pro-
ducing evidence of a particular fact in issue." To discharge this bur-
den, the parties must "satisfy the judge that they have a quantity of
evidence fit to be considered by the jury and to form a reasonable basis
for the verdict." '
The second burden, often referred to as the "burden of persua-
sion," is the burden of persuading the trier of fact that an alleged fact,
upon which evidence has been introduced, is true.4" It is, in essence, an
obligation to establish a sufficient degree of belief concerning the verac-
ity of the fact in the mind of the factfinder.41 The party who has this
obligation bears the risk that the finder of fact's belief will not be suffi-
ciently high to induce her to act as the party wishes."2 The requisite
degree of belief depends upon the nature of the action. In the familiar
formulae, the standard in criminal cases is "beyond a reasonable
doubt,""' in some extraordinary civil controversies it is proof "by clear,
strong and convincing evidence," 4 and in civil cases generally it is
proof "by a preponderance of the evidence."""
There is a variety of reasons why the burden of proof may be
allocated to one party or another. No single reason is determinative in
any situation; rather, the allocation of the burdens "will depend upon
the weight that is given to any one or more of several factors, including:
(1) the natural tendency to place the burdens on the party desiring
" See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 336, at 947.
39 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2487, at 293 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (emphasis
omitted). Regarding the "sufficiency" of the evidence to carry the burden of production,
see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.11, at 268-79 (2d ed. 1977) (dis-
cussing the sufficiency of the evidence to establish a proposition); MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 338, at 953 ("The evidence must be such that a reasona-
ble man could draw from it the inference of the existence of the particular fact to be
proved . . ").
40 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 336, at 947.
41 See, e.g, CAL. EvID. CODE § 115 (West 1966) (defining burden of proof).
42 "A risk of non-persuasion naturally exists anytime one person attempts to per-
suade another to act or not to act. If the other does not change his course of action or
nonaction, the person desiring change has, of course, failed." MCCORMICK ON EvI-
DENCE, supra note 34, § 336, at 948 (footnote omitted).
4s See Id. § 339, at 956.
44 Id.
45 Id. One commentator suggests that these formulae are equivalent to statements
that the trier of fact must find that the fact is almost certainly true, highly probably
true, and probably true respectively. See McBaine, Burden of Proof. Degrees of Belief
32 CALIF. L. REv. 242, 246-47 (1944). Of the traditional formulae, only the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard explicitly goes directly to the state of mind of the trier of
fact. The "preponderance" and "clear, strong and convincing" standards point to the
evidence itself and thus are somewhat awkward vehicles for expressing the requisite
state of mind of the trier of fact. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 34,
§ 339, at 956-57.
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change, (2) special policy considerations ... ,1 (3) convenience, (4)
fairness, and (5) the judicial estimate of the probabilities."4
Determining dangerousness under the Bail Reform Act is actually
a two step process. 48 First, certain facts asserted to warrant a finding of
dangerousness must be proved; that is, evidence supporting the exis-
tence of those facts must be produced and the judicial officer must
thereby be persuaded that they are true. Second, proof of these facts
must persuade the judicial officer that the accused is dangerous.
In its only statement regarding the burden of proof in the deten-
tion hearing, the Bail Reform Act states "[tihe facts the judicial officer
uses to support a finding .. .that no condition or combination of con-
ditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the
community shall be supported by clear and convincing evidence."' 49 For
example, if the defendant's history of criminal conduct isasserted to
warrant detention, evidence of past criminal acts such as records of ar-
rest and conviction must be produced.5" This evidence must be clear
and convincing, such that the judicial officer is persuaded that it is
"highly probably true" ' that the accused actually has a history of
criminal conduct. Once the existence of such past criminal conduct is
proved, it serves as evidence on the factual question whether the ac-
cused is dangerous. If such evidence is sufficiently persuasive, detention
will be imposed.
The Bail Reform Act does not explicitly allocate the burdens of
production and persuasion at either step, but the legislative history in-
dicates that both burdens are on the prosecution at both steps. Accord-
ing to the House Judiciary Committee, "the burden of establishing that
a defendant is dangerous [or] a flight risk is on the prosecution."52 This
46 See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) (burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt placed on prosecution in order to minimize conviction of
innocent persons); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (noting the
high stakes involved in a criminal prosecution due to the possibility of stigmatization
and loss of liberty).
47 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 337, at 952 (footnote omitted).
48 The dangerousness determination is a two-step process because it involves both
backward-looking and forward-looking assessments. This distinguishes it from the
usual trial of an issue of fact, in which the inquiry is exclusively into the past to deter-
mine what happened. In the detention hearing, the judicial officer must first determine
what has happened in the past (the first step) and then from these facts determine the
ultimate fact: what is going to happen in the future (the second step).
49 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(0 (West 1985).
5o See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 22. This is the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee report on the version of the Act that was passed by the Senate on February 2,
1984. Regarding the burden of proof and the § 3142(e) presumptions, it is identical to
the Bail Reform Act as enacted.
5
1 See McBaine, supra note 45, at 254.
52"H.R. REP. No. 1121, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1984). Although the bill re-
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is the sole statement in the reports on the issue of the burden of proof
in the detention hearing, and it indicates that Congress generally in-
tended that in this process the government bear the burden of produc-
ing evidence and persuading the judicial officer. Moreover, this is con-
sistent with the placement of the burden in criminal trials,5" and the
policy considerations that motivate that practice. Finally, the section
3142(e) presumptions, which in some cases shift to the defendant the
burden of establishing that she is not dangerous," would be redundant
and meaningless if the burden were not otherwise on the government.
The statute and legislative history are significantly less instructive,
however, as to the degree to which the judicial officer must be per-
suaded that the accused is dangerous. As noted above,55 the statute
states that the facts the judicial officer uses to support a finding of dan-
gerousness must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.56 Thus,
in the first step of the process, the judicial officer must be persuaded to
the degree indicated by the "clear and convincing evidence" formula
57
that the facts the government asserts to show dangerousness are true.
The statute says nothing, however, regarding the degree of belief of
dangerousness these facts, once proved, must produce in the mind of the
judicial officer before the accused may be detained. The pertinent sec-
tions of the legislative history of all preventive detention statutes re-
ported since 1981 similarly do not address the degree to which the judi-
cial officer must be persuaded in this second step.58
In sum, Congress has provided no indication of the degree to
which the judicial officer must be convinced that the accused is danger-
ous, thus sanctioning judicial discretion in a situation that calls for a
prophetic prediction of future behavior. Because the burden of persua-
sion is on the prosecution, the judicial officer must believe, at least to
the degree indicated by the "preponderance of the evidence" formula,
that the accused is dangerous. Thus the lowest of all evidentiary stan-
ported in this report was not ultimately adopted, it is identical to the Bail Reform Act
in all aspects relevant to the burden of proof at the detention hearing.
11 See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) (holding that the
prosecution has the burden of persuading the fact-finder beyond a reasonable doubt).
" See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text; see also S. RPP. No 225, supra
note 2, at 19 ("[fIt is appropriate in such circumstances that the burden shift to the
defendant to establish a basis for concluding that there are conditions of release suffi-
cient to assure that he will not engage in dangerous criminal activity pending his
trial.").
55 See supra text accompanying note 24.
5 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(f) (West 1985).
5 See supra text accompanying note 51.
See H.R. REP. No. 1121, supra note 52, at 27; S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2,
at 25; S. REP. No. 147, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1983); S. REP. No. 317, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 52-53 (1982).
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dards, generally applicable only to civil cases, is the only check on judi-
cial discretion.
B. Presumptions
The law regarding presumptions is among the most muddled of all
areas of the law.5 9 Courts have used the term "presumption" to mean
many different, unrelated things.60 Because the meaning of the term is
ambiguous and the law on the subject is confused, it is particularly
unfortunate that the Bail Reform Act is silent as to precisely how the
section 3142(e) presumptions are intended to operate. This section will
analyze the language of the statute and the legislative history in order
to determine how the presumptions affect the process of assessing
whether a defendant is dangerous.61
A presumption is a mechanism that deems one fact, the "fact pre-
sumed," to be true when the truth of another fact, the "fact proved," is
established. 62 Under the Bail Reform Act, the fact that no conditions of
release will reasonably assure the safety of the community is deemed to
be true when the "fact" of one of the enumerated current charges plus
prior conviction,68 or the "fact" of the current charge alone," is
established.
Except in the case of a "conclusive" or "irrebuttable" presump-
tion,65 the party against whom a presumption operates can introduce
5 See supra note 34.
60 Professor Laughlin, who has described eight ways "presumption" has been
used, observed:
In checking source material relative to various of the presumptions re-
ferred to, it soon becomes evident that the word has been so promiscuously
used as to be devoid of much of its utility. The language of the law is
permeated by "magic words," . . . which are used as substitutes for exact
analyses. The word "presumption" is rapidly becoming such a word.
Laughlin, supra note 34, at 195-96 (1953) (footnotes omitted).
61 Basic elements of the law of presumptions and the theories of their proper role
in the fact-finding process are discussed in this section, but a general overview is not
within the scope of this Comment. There will be no attempt here, therefore, to set forth
every sense in which the term has been used. General issues regarding presumptions
will be addressed only as they are relevant to understanding the presumptions of the
Bail Reform Act.
62 See Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in
Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YA.E L.J. 165, 165 (1969). More gener-
ally, a presumption has been defined as "a standardized practice, under which certain
facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as proof of other
facts." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 342, at 965.
6. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3142(e)(1)-(3), 3142(0 (West 1985) (the "fact proved" that
gives rise to the first presumption).
" Id. § 3142(e) (the "fact proved" that gives rise to the second presumption).
65 A "conclusive" or "irrebuttable" presumption is actually not a presumption at
all. If one fact is conclusively presumed from, proof of another fact, then the party
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evidence that contradicts the existence of the fact presumed. If such evi-
dence is sufficient to render the presumption inoperative, the presump-
tion is said to have been overcome or rebutted.66 The Bail Reform Act
explicitly states that the presumptions of dangerousness are rebutta-
ble.6 Nonetheless, exactly what the accused must do to overcome the
presumption is left unanswered by the statute.
At the beginning of the dangerousness determination process, the
burden of producing evidence and persuading the judicial officer is on
the prosecution."' To presume that the defendant is dangerous affects
the burden of proof in one of three ways. At a minimum, presumptions
satisfy the party's burden of producing evidence. Such a "permissive
presumption" 69 allows, but does not require, the finder of fact to infer
the fact presumed from the fact proved. It does not, however, shift ei-
ther the burden of production or the burden of persuasion to the party
against whom it operates.70 Thus, if the section 3142(e) presumptions
are purely permissive, the judicial officer is permitted, but not required,
to find an accused dangerous on the basis of the current charge alone,
and the accused is under no obligation to introduce evidence to the con-
trary to avoid detention.
Although the Supreme Court has used the term "presumption" to
refer to such permissive inferences,71 most commentators have used the
term to describe a standardized practice that satisfies a party's burden
of producing evidence on the issue, and requires the adversary to pro-
duce credible evidence with regard to the presumed fact. 2 In some
cases, the burden of persuasion is shifted to the adversary as well.73
against whom the presumption operates is precluded from showing evidence that the
fact presumed does not exist. In reality, this is a rule of substantive law, because the
existence of the fact presumed is immaterial. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 2492,
at 307-08. In a commonly cited example, if it is proven that a child is under seven
years old, the courts have stated that it is conclusively presumed that she did not com-
mit a felony. This is not a presumption at all, but a rule of law that someone under the
age of seven cannot be convicted of a felony. See, e.g, 1 E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS
OF EVIDENCE 31 (1961).
e See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 62, at 165.
6 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(e) (West 1985).
See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
69 See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
70 See id.; see also Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 840 n.3 (1973) (permis-
sive presumption described in jury instructions).
7 See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
7 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 342, at 965.
See id. The development of the two major theoretical positions discussed in the
text are attributable, respectively, to the work of James Bradley Thayer and Edmund
Morris Morgan. They have come to be referred to simply as "the Thayer approach"
and "the Morgan approach." See, e.g, Ashford & Risinger, supra note 62, at 169.
Thayer's and Morgan's views are put forth in their influential treatises on evidence.
See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 313-52 (1898); 1 E. MOR-
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The Court has defined these as two types of "mandatory
presumptions.
'74
Under the first of these two approaches, the effect of the section
3142(e) presumptions would be to shift to the accused the burden of
producing some evidence that there are conditions of release that would
reasonably assure the safety of the community. The burden of persuad-
ing the judicial officer that there are no such conditions would remain
on the prosecution, and the presumption involved would have no fur-
ther effect. 5 Under the second approach, the section 3142(e) presump-
tion would also shift to the accused the burden of persuading the judi-
cial officer that there are conditions that would assure the safety of the
community.
76
To understand the effect of the section 3142(e) presumptions on
the determination of dangerousness, it is crucial to determine which of
the three above-described interpretations Congress intended. The only
statements in the legislative history of the Bail Reform Act regarding
the effect of the section 3142(e) presumptions are made in reference to
the first presumption, which mandates that dangerousness be presumed
upon the facts of the current charge and a previous conviction for an
offense committed while on pretrial release.7 7 Referring to these "basic
facts," the Senate Judiciary Committee report states "it is appropriate
in such circumstances that the burden shift to the defendant to establish
a basis for concluding that there are conditions of release sufficient to
assure that he will not engage in dangerous criminal activity pending
his trial."'77 According to the report, "[s]uch a history of pretrial crimi-
nality is, absent mitigating information, a rational basis7" for conclud-
ing that a defendant poses a significant threat to community
GAN, supra note 65, at 31-44.
71 See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 & n.16 (1979).
7' The practical result under this theory in civil actions is that the parties relying
on the presumption can survive a motion for a directed verdict at the end of their own
case. The presumption thereafter disappears. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 34, § 344, at 973-74; J. THAYER, supra note 73, at 336.
76 Those who have argued in favor of this latter approach stress that the require-
ments for dissipating any presumption should depend on the reasons for which it is
created. They point out that although courts may profess to be applying the former
rule, they are often influenced by such considerations and apply the latter. See I E.
MORGAN, supra note 65, at 34-37.
7 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3142(e)(1)-(3), 3142(0(1) (West 1985).
11 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 19 (emphasis added).This statement is re-
cited verbatim in the Senate Judiciary Committee reports of every other bail reform bill
reported since 1981 that contained the presumptions. See S. REP. No. 147, supra note
58, at 46; S. REP. No. 317, supra note 58, at 50.
7' The use of the term "rational basis" appears to be a direct reference to the test
the Court has developed for assessing the constitutionality of mandatory presumptions
used in criminal prosecutions. See infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
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safety .... "80
These statements indicate that the section 3142(e) presumptions
are mandatory presumptions. They do more than merely permit the
judicial officer to find an accused dangerous upon proof of the specified
facts. Rather, the presumptions place upon the accused at least the bur-
den of producing evidence on the question.
From these few clues, however, it is extremely difficult to deter-
mine whether Congress intended that the presumptions in the Bail Re-
form Act shift to the accused both the burden of production and persua-
sion, or only the burden of production."' It is not clear whether
"establish a basis for concluding" means "establish credible evi-
dence"-in which case the prosecution would still bear the burden of
persuasion to the degree indicated by the clear and convincing evidence
standard-or "persuade the judicial officer to conclude"-in which case
the defendant would bear the burden of persuasion to some unspecified
degree."2 In United States v. Jessup83 the First Circuit determined that
the presumptions shift the burden of production but not the burden of
persuasion. 84 The reasons for which the presumptions exist, however,
indicate that the better interpretation is that Congress intended the bur-
den of persuasion to shift to the defendant.
The Bail Reform Act is premised on the notion that judges can
identify those few defendants who are dangerous, 5 that in most cases
the accused is not dangerous, and that the determination should be
80 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 19; see also S. REP. No. 147, supra note 58,
at 45 (same statement); S. REP. No. 317, supra note 58, at 49 (same statement). The
introductory discussion of the presumptions, however, states that both presumptions
arise under "sets of circumstances under which a strong probability arises that no form
of conditional release will be adequate" to insure the safety of the community. S. REP.
No. 225, supra note 2, at 19. Moreover, in its discussion of the set of instances under
which the second presumption arises, the Committee made no distinction with reference
to the accused's burden. See id. at 19-20. For these reasons, it is reasonable to infer that
the two presumptions shift the burden to the accused in the same way.
81 It may be irrelevant whether the section 3142(e) presumptions shift both com-
ponents of the burden of proof to the accused, or only the burden of production. The
Supreme Court has indicated that, in a criminal trial, both types are "mandatory"
presumptions and are to be judged by the same standard. See County Court v. Allen,
442 U.S. 140, 157 & n.16 (1979). There is at least one commentator, however, who has
suggested that the distinction between these two types of "mandatory" presumption
might be important with regard to the tests for their constitutional validity. See Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 346, at 988.
82 The question of the degree to which the accused would then have to persuade
the judicial officer is an even greater riddle.
83 757 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1985).
See id. at 381-83; accord United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489, 499 (N.D.
Cal. 1985); United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
85 See, e.g, S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 6-7.
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made on a case by case basis.86 Thus, in the general run of cases, Con-
gress determined that the probability that the defendant is dangerous is
low, and that the government must introduce evidence and persuade the
judicial officer otherwise.8 7 In those instances that give rise to the pre-
sumptions, however, Congress determined that just the opposite is true.
In those circumstances, Congress stated, there is a "strong
probability" '8 that the person is dangerous. Therefore, Congress estab-
lished that in those specified circumstances, the status quo should re-
flect the probability for dangerousness and the accused should be de-
tained. The burden of persuading the judicial officer to disturb the
status quo is to be borne by the accused. It appears, then, that Congress
intended that the presumptions not disappear upon the introduction of
evidence by the accused, but that they shift to the accused the burden of
persuading the judicial officer that there are conditions of release that
will reasonably assure the safety of the community. 9
III. DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF PRESUMPTIONS
The due process requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments of the Constitution place limitations on the use of presumptions
that operate against criminal defendants. 90 Since the early part of this"
century, the Supreme Court has attempted to prescribe standards for
testing the validity of presumptive language.91 This effort culminated in
the 1979 decisions of County Court v. Allen92 and Sandstrom v. Mon-
tana.93 In Allen and Sandstrom the Court determined that the proper
test to be employed in evaluating the constitutionality of presumptions
depends upon the type of presumption in question.
In Allen, the Court laid out the constitutional standards for evalu-
86 See id. at 19.
87 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 19. The phrase "strong probability" suggests
a degree of belief similar to that suggested by the phrase "highly probably true," which
Professor McBaine used to describe the clear and convincing evidence standard. See
McBaine, supra note 45, at 251-54.
s Cf United States v. Aiello, 598 F. Supp. 740, 744-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (indicat-
ing that "heavy burden" of rebutting statutory presumption places perhaps even the
burden of persuasion on the defendant). In United States v. Jessup, however, the court
argued a "middle ground" position that the presumption did not disappear after the
accused had satisfied her burden of production. See 757 F.2d at 383-84. Rather, the
presumption still remained as one of the factors to consider in determining whether the
accused was dangerous or presented a serious risk of flight. See id.
90 See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
91 See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v.
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
02 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
3 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
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ating permissive presumptions and those mandatory presumptions that
shift at least the burden of production.94 According to the Court, "in
criminal cases, the ultimate test of any device's constitutional validity in
a given case remains constant: the device must not undermine the
factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the
State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt." 5 Because
permissive presumptions leave the trier of fact free to credit or reject
the inference and do not shift the burden of proof, they affect the
factfinder's responsibility only if, "under the facts of the case, there is
no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the
inference." 96 Only in that situation, stated the Court, is there a risk
that the use of the permissible inference has caused the presumably
rational factfinder to make an erroneous factual determination.
97
In contrast, the Court stated that a mandatory presumption affects
the placement of the burden of proof by telling the trier of fact that she
must find the presumed fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least until
the defendant "has come forward with some evidence to rebut the pre-
sumed connection between the two facts."9" This presumption effec-
tively removes factfinding responsibility from the trier of fact. Because
a mandatory presumption has a more significant effect on the factfind-
ing process, the Court stated that when the validity of a mandatory
presumption is at issue, existence of evidence sufficient to support a
conviction is irrelevant:99
To the extent that the trier of fact is forced to abide by the
presumption, and may not reject it based on an independent
evaluation of the particular facts presented by the State, the
In Allen, four persons were convicted of possession of illegal handguns under
New York state law. See 442 U.S. at 144. The evidence showed that two illegal hand-
guns were found in an open handbag in the front of the car occupied by the defendants
belonging to one of the defendants. See id. at 143. A New York statute provided that,
with certain exceptions, the presence of a firearm in an automobile was presumptive
evidence of its possession by all persons occupying the vehicle. See id. at 142 (citing
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1967)). The trial judge instructed the jury
in language that first suggested that the presumption stated only a "permissive infer-
ence" and then suggested that it shifted the burden of production. Id. at 161. In a
federal habeas corpus proceeding, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
the presumption shifted the burden of proof to the defendant and was "unconstitutional
on its face." Id. at 143. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the presumption was
only permissive because it did not shift either the burden of production or persuasion to
the defendant. See id. at 160-63.
" Id. at 156.
Id. at 157.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 159-60.
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analysis of the presumption's constitutional validity, is logi-
cally divorced from those facts and based on the presump-
tion's accuracy in the run of cases.100
Allen, therefore, requires that mandatory presumptions be ana-
lyzed on their face to determine whether they are constitutional. Con-
stitutionality depends on the adequacy of the connection between the
facts that give rise to the presumption and the fact that is presumed." 1
The Court has defined the standard that the connection must meet in a
series of cases, beginning with Tot v. United States.
102
In Tot the Court determined that there must be a "rational con-
nection" between the basic fact and the presumed fact:
Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sus-
tained if there be no rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the
one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of
connection between the two in common experi-
ence. . . . [W]here the inference is so strained as not to
have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we
know them, it is not competent for the legislature to create it
as a rule governing the procedure of courts.1 3
It was not clear from Tot, however, whether determining that a
connection was rational was a question of relevancy or sufficiency of
the connection between the facts proved and the fact presumed. 1O° If it
was a question of relevancy, a presumption would be valid if the
proved fact tended to prove the presumed fact. But if it was a question
of sufficiency, a presumption would be valid only if the existence of the
proved fact made it more likely than not that the presumed fact was
true.
1 0 5
The Court made it clear in Leary v. United States 06 that the test
was one of sufficiency. Reviewing Tot and the subsequent cases in
10 Id. at 159 (citation omitted).
101 See id. at 156.
102 319 U.S. 463 (1943). Tot involved the validity of a presumption stating that
possession of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence was
presumptive evidence that the firearm was shipped or transported in interstate com-
merce. Id. at 464. The Court, finding that there was no rational basis for concluding
from possession of the firearm that the acquisition must have been through interstate
commerce, held that the presumption violated the defendant's right to due process. Id.
at 468.
103 Id. at 467-68 (citations omitted).
104 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 347, at 993.
105 Id.
106 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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which presumptions were challenged,10 7 the Court held that a criminal
statutory presumption is unconstitutional "unless it can at least be said
with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than
not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend." '
In Sandstrom v. Montana,109 moreover, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that the validity of mandatory presumptions that shift the burden
of persuasion to the defendant may be tested by a more stringent stan-
dard and, in fact, may be unconstitutional under all circumstances. In
Sandstrom, the defendant was charged with "deliberate homicide," in
that he "purposely or knowingly" caused the death of the victim. 1
The defendant had previously confessed to the slaying,'11 so the only
issue was the question of intent. The trial judge instructed the jury that
" '[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences
of his voluntary acts.' "112 The jury found the defendant guilty and sen-
tenced him to one hundred years in prison. 1 3
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction in a unanimous deci-
sion. 1 The Court determined that a reasonable jury could well have
interpreted the presumption as either conclusive,' or "as a direction to
find intent upon proof of the defendant's voluntary actions (and their
'ordinary' consequences), unless the defendant proved the contrary by
some quantum of proof which may have been considerably greater than
'some' evidence-thus effectively shifting the burden of persuasion on
the element of intent.""' The Court held that under either interpreta-
tion the defendant would have been deprived of his right to due process
of law, and therefore, the instruction was unconstitutional."1
The Court reasoned that if the jury had interpreted the instruction
as shifting the burden of persuasion, it could have concluded that upon
proof of the slaying and of additional facts not themselves sufficient to
establish the element of intent, the burden was shifted to the defendant
107 See United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1965) (presumption of
possession, custody, or control from proof of presence at illegal still held invalid);
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1965) (presumption of "carrying on" the
business of distiller from proof of presence at illegal still held valid).
'08 Leary, 395 U.S. at 36 (emphasis added).
109 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
110 Id. at 512 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1978)).
I' Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 512.
112 Id. at 513.
1i Id.
14 See id. at 511.
115 Id. at 517. The Court stated that a conclusive presumption could be inter-
preted "not technically as a presumption at all, but rather as an irrebuttable direction
by the court to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the presumption." Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 524.
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to prove that he lacked the requisite intent.1 18 Such a presumption
would be constitutionally deficient because the "'State must prove
every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and. . . may
not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by means of such a
presumption."' 1 9
The Court's analysis in Sandstrom leaves unanswered the ques-
tion of whether a presumption may ever be used to assign the burden of
persuasion to the defendant. 120 It is clear, at least, that the burden of
persuasion may not be shifted unless a rational finder of fact could find
the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt from the facts proved.'
This requirement ensures that use of the presumption, if it is in fact
the basis for the finding of the element in question, does not relieve the
prosecution of its burden of proof, nor withdraw from the finder of fact
the function of determining whether the prosecution has carried its
burden.
122
In summary, statutory presumptions that merely state permissible
inferences are to be evaluated on the record of the case, and are valid
unless, under all the facts of the case, there is no rational way the
finder of fact could make the connection permitted by the inference.
Presumptions that shift the burden of production are evaluated on their
face and are valid if the existence of the proved fact makes it more
likely than not that the presumed fact is true. Conclusive presumptions
and presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion are also evaluated
on their face, and are only valid if the finder of fact could rationally
find the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt from proof of the
basic fact.
IV. RELEVANCY OF DUE PROCESS STANDARDS TO BAIL REFORM
ACT PRESUMPTIONS
The Supreme Court has developed due process standards for the
use of presumptions that operate against criminal defendants in the
context of trials. A pretrial detention hearing, however, is not a crimi-
118 See id.
119 Id. (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977)).
120 Some maintain Sandstrom establishes that a presumption may never be used
to shift the burden of persuasion. See Allen & Degrazia, The Constitutional Require-
ment of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt in Criminal Cases: A Comment Upon In-
cipient Chaos in the Lower Courts, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1982); Graham,
Evidence and Trial Advocacy Workshop: Presumptions-More Than You Ever
Wanted to Know and Yet Were Too Disinterested to Ask, 17 CRiM. L. BULL. 431, 439
(1981).
121 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 347, at 997.
122 See id.
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nal trial. It is therefore necessary to determine whether the same proce-
dural standards that apply to the use of presumptions at a trial should
apply to the use of the section 3142(e) presumptions at a pretrial
hearing.
123
The importance of what is at stake for the criminally accused was
recognized over a century ago in Miles v United States.124 In Miles, the
Court approved the trial judge's instructions that
[a] juror in a criminal case ought not to condemn . . .un-
less he be so convinced by the evidence, no matter what the
class of evidence, of the defendant's guilt, that a prudent man
would feel safe to act upon that conviction in matters of the
highest concern and importance to his own dearest personal
interests.
125
More recently, the Court was asked to determine whether proof
beyond a reasonable doubt was among the essentials of due process and
fair treatment required at the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is
charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult.126 The Court held that such proof is required127 because "[t]he
accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty
upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigma-
tized by the conviction."' 28
Although these cases involved criminal trials and the burden of
proof required for conviction, the accused has the same interests in
maintaining her freedom before trial and in avoiding the stigmatization
of being labeled dangerous.
Detention prior to trial is a severe restriction of the accused's lib-
erty. Beyond the obvious deprivation of liberty that occurs anytime the
state incarcerates an individual, there are several factors operating in
123 In United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1985), the First Circuit
held that the standards for the use of presumptions at trial do not apply at the pretrial
detention hearing. See id. at 386-87. Thus, instead of using the "more likely than not"
standard of Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969), they considered only
whether the presumption was supported by "substantial" information. SeeJessup, 757
F.2d at 387.
TheJessup decision is fundamentally flawed by its failure to recognize the severe
restriction of liberty occasioned by a decision to detain prior to trial. Because the inter-
ests of defendants in this context are so similar to their interests at trial, the same
standards should apply.
124 103 U.S. 304 (1880).
125 Id. at 309.
12' See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
127 Id. at 368.
128 Id. at 363.
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the pretrial detention situation that make the deprivation of liberty par-
ticularly severe. First, pretrial imprisonment is often imposed under
conditions that are as harsh, if not harsher, than those imposed upon
convicted prisoners.129 Although the Supreme Court has held that con-
ditions of pretrial detention that most would consider severe do not nec-
essarily violate the right to due process of law,130 the nature of the
conditions is relevant to the question of the degree to which liberty is
infringed.
Reports on the conditions under which persons are detained prior
to trial commonly include descriptions of foul smelling air, over-crowd-
ing, annoying levels of noise, and sexual perversion.13' In many cases,
those accused of crime for the first time are not segregated from con-
victed prisoners.' 2 There are rarely any rehabilitative programs or
planned recreational activities. The days are filled with endless monot-
ony.13 3 Reports that have described the conditions under which pretrial
detainees are commonly confined clearly indicate that the infringement
upon the liberty of an unconvicted person is significant.
Second, there is a high positive correlation between pretrial deten-
tion and the severity of any subsequent sentence. This correlation has
been shown to exist in virtually every study over the past 50 years, 3
and has been found again in the most recently completed government
study of pretrial release.' 5 The accused is greatly restricted in aiding
in her own defense and is often detained at a location so distant as to
prevent consultation with counsel, thereby further handicapping the
preparation of a defense.'3 6 Finally, prosecutors say that the prospect of
12 See, e.g., Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical
Study, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 632 n.2, 637 n.26 (1964); Note, Compelling Appear-
ance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1058-59 (1954).
130 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979).
131 See, e.g., P. WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE: A NATIONAL STUDY OF PRETRIAL
RELEASE 83-86 (1974); R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN
BAIL SYSTEM 33-43 (1965) (anecdotal reports).
132 See P. WICE, supra note 131, at 88-89.
133 See id. at 91.
134 See J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DE-
TENTION IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 185 (1979); see also Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial
Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 641, 642-43 (1964) (representative study); Note, supra
note 129, at 1053-54 (same).
133 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRETRIAL RE-
LEASE AND MISCONDUCT 5 (1985) (special report) [hereinafter cited as BJS STUDY].
Although causation cannot be inferred reliably from correlative data, see, e.g., J.
GOLDKAMP, supra note 134, at 186, this recent study used statistical techniques that
reduced the confounding influence of other possible factors. The interpretation made
was "that detainees receive harsher sentences because of their pretrial detention." BJS
STUDY, supra, at 5 n.13.
16 See P. WICE, supra note 131, at 92-93.
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pretrial detention is one of the primary forces encouraging defendants
to enter premature guilty pleas."" 7
In addition to severely restricting an accused's liberty, the state
will stigmatize the pretrial detainee by branding her as too dangerous
to be in the community. This stigma can affect present and future em-
ployment, as well as relationships with family and the community at
large.1"8 This negative effect on an accused's reputation may be irrepa-
rable even if the person is ultimately acquitted at trial.'
In summary, the concerns that lead to the protection of the accused
from the operation of irrational presumptions at trial are also impli-
cated at a detention hearing. The interests of unconvicted defendants in
maintaining their liberty and avoiding the stigma of being branded too
"dangerous" to be in the community are at stake at the detention hear-
ing as well as at a trial. For these reasons, the due process limitations
upon the use of presumptions in criminal trials must operate at the
detention hearing to protect the accused from unwarranted detention
prior to trial.
V. TESTING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRESUMPTIONS OF
DANGEROUSNESS
Having determined that the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment places affirmative limits on the use of presumptions in criminal
137 See id. at 91.
138 In United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1985), Judge
Boochever stated:
"Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source
of income, and impair his family relationships."
- * * Society has no mechanism to recompense an individual for in-
come lost or damages to a career due to pretrial confinement. Nor do we
compensate the individual and his family for their mental suffering and
loss of reputation due to pretrial incarceration.
Id. at 1414 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975); see also Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct
and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 717, 743
(1972) ("[L]abeling someone a potential criminal would have much the same stigma-
tizing effect as labeling him a past offender.") (footnote omitted); Comment, Preventive
Detention and United States v. Edwards: Burdening the Innocent, 32 AM. U.L. REv.
191, 211 (1982) ("[E]ven if the accused is found not guilty of the charged offense, the
label of 'dangerous potential criminal' can be a stigma to the accused and can adversely
affect his opportunity for future employment.") (footnote omitted).
189 See United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1414 (9th Cir. 1985)
(Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he injuries consequent
upon pretrial confinement may not be reparable upon a subsequent acquittal."); Camp-
bell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 530 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Even without the stigma
of conviction, however, pretrial detention may permanently damage the detainee's
reputation.").
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prosecutions, and that those limits apply in the pretrial detention hear-
ing, the presumptions of the Bail Reform Act must be analyzed accord-
ing to the standards developed to ensure that the accused's right to due
process of law is not violated.
" The section 3142(e) presumptions, which, at minimum, shift to
the accused the burden of production of evidence on the issue of dan-
gerousness,1 40 are constitutional only if the facts that give rise to the
presumption of dangerousness make it more likely than not that the
person is actually dangerous.1 4 Thus, the question is whether a person
charged with the crimes specified by the Act and with a specified crimi-
nal history is more likely than not a person as to whom no conditions of
release will reasonably assure the safety of the community.142
In the necessarily empirical analysis of the connection between the
fact proved and the fact presumed, the Court has on several occasions
stated that Congress's determination must weigh heavily.1 43 The Court
reiterated this deference to Congress's determination in Leary v. United
States."4 In Leary, however, the Court examined the legislative history
of the statute and found it inconclusive as to the strength of the connec-
tion between the presumed and basic fact. 45 The Court therefore con-
ducted an extensive review of the relevant literature146 and found the
connection insufficient to meet the more likely than not standard."7
This insufficiency, the Court stated, was not "overcome by paying, as
we do, the utmost deference to the congressional determination that this
presumption was warranted.
'148
As was the case in Leary, there is little in the hearings and reports
140 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
141 See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).
142 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3142(e), 3142(0(1) (West 1985).
141 See, e.g., United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965). In Gainey the
Court held that there was a rational connection between a defendant's unexplained
presence at an illegal still, and the crime of operating the still. The Court stated that
"[t]he process of making the determination of rationality is, by its nature, highly empir-
ical, and in matters not within specialized judicial competence or completely common-
place, significant weight should be accorded the capacity of Congress to amass the stuff
of actual experience and cull conclusions from it." Id. at 67.
144 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969) ("[11n the judicial assessment the congressional determi-
nation favoring the particular presumption must, of course, weigh heavily.")
145 See id. at 39-46.
146 See id. at 47-52.
147 See id. at 52.
141 Id. at 53. Although the Court recently held that from a legal standpoint there
is nothing inherently unattainable about judges predicting future criminal conduct, it
did not imply that this was an area of specialized judicial competence. See Schall v.
Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2417-18 (1984). For a discussion suggesting that very few
have the competence to make the dangerousness determination, see Slobogin, Danger-
ousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 127-30 (1984).
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on the Bail Reform Act indicating that presuming dangerousness from
the facts specified in the statute is anything more than mere specula-
tion. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the version of
the Bail Reform Act that passed the Senate in February 1984"" merely
asserts that upon proof of the specified facts a strong probability arises
that no form of conditional release will be adequate, but does not sub-
stantiate these assertions beyond calling them a "rational basis" for
concluding that the defendant poses a threat to the community!50 Re-
garding the second presumption, the report cites both dangerousness
and bail jumping as highly probable upon a showing of probable cause
of the specified charges."' Again, the report makes broad assertions,
and labels them "obvious considerations," yet presents no substantiation
except a reference to the testimony of one Senator.152 This testimony
also contains no empirical support regarding the dangerousness pre-
sumptions.153 In fact, the Senate Judiciary Committee reports of every
bail reform bill since 1981 containing the presumptions use virtually
identical language and similarly, contain no empirical evidence of any
connection between the specified facts proved and the presumed fact of
dangerousness. 5' An inquiry into the sufficiency of the connection be-
tween the facts upon which the section 3142(e) presumptions are based
and the presumed fact of dangerousness must therefore go beyond the
legislative history of the Bail Reform Act.
The second presumption under section 3142(e) arises on a show-
ing of probable cause of the current crime charged in certain cases in-
volving drug trafficking or a felony committed with a firearm. Studies
of pretrial misconduct have shown clearly that there is no significant
relationship between the current crime charged and the defendant's
proclivity for engaging in pretrial criminal behavior. 5 A study con-
149 S. 1762, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Regarding the presumptions, this bill
was identical to the Bail Reform Act as enacted.
180 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 19.
' See id. For a description of the offenses that trigger the presumption, see
supra notes 31-32.
152 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 20 & n.58.
18' Bail Reform: Hearings on S. 440, S. 482, S. 1253 & S. 1554 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 56-60 (1981) (testimony of Senator Lawton Chiles). Senator Chiles did present a
study dealing with the likelihood that defendants charged with drug offenses will fail to
appear. The study concludes that "[tihe failure to appear rate for 'drug defendants' was
17% in [the United States Southern District of Florida]." Id. at 64 app.
1" See S. REP. No. 147, supra note 58, at 45-47 (1983); S. REP. No. 317, supra
note 58, at 49-50 (1982). The bill favorably reported to the House of Representatives
by the House Judiciary Committee, only eleven days before the Bail Reform Act was
passed, did not even contain the presumptions. See H.R. REP. No. 1121, supra note
52, at 3 (report on H.R. 5865).
158 See P. WICE, supra note 131, at 78-80. But cf. id. at 80 ("This limited survey,
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ducted at the Harvard Law School found that "the initial charge, often
considered one of the most important factors in setting bail, proves to be
little better than a random indicator of ricidivism."'"5 Defendants
charged with armed offenses recidivated in only 12.5% of the cases
studied.157 Moreover, persons charged with drug offenses recidivated in
only 8.8% of the cases studied.' 58 A study by the National Bureau of
Standards found that less than 30% of persons charged with crimes in-
volving dangerous drugs recidivated on pretrial release.1 59 In summary,
from proof of the facts that give rise to the second presumption of sec-
tion 3142(e) one cannot claim that it will be more likely than not that
the presumed fact of dangerousness is true.
The strength of the connection between the facts upon which the
first presumption of section 3142(e) arises 60 and the presumed fact of
dangerousness is significantly more difficult to assess. Despite intuitive
appeal, the absence of evidence in the legislative history suggests that
the existence of a connection is, at best, speculative.
Moreover, there is evidence that indicates that the connection does
not meet the more likely than not standard. Recall that this first pre-
sumption arises on proof both of specified current charges and a prior
record of specified types of misconduct while on pretrial release. 6 ' A
recent study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that although a
prior criminal record is positively correlated with pretrial miscon-
duct, 62 the connection was not sufficient to meet the more likely than
not standard.'6 The Harvard study found that the correlation between
a history of violent crimes in the past ten years and misconduct on
however, cannot be interpreted as totally discrediting the concept of preventive
detention.").
"' Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
300, 311 (1971); see also id. at 382, 392 (relevant statistical tables).
M See id. at 383.
188 See id. at 382. This recidivism rate by drug offenders was less than that of a
number of offenders who do not raise the section 3142(e) presumptions, including those
who commit rape (10.3%), robbery (11.7%), aggravated assault (17.1%), and arson
(10%). This comparison is not made to suggest that the statute is underinclusive, but
rather to suggest that Congress did not carefully identify the proper indicia of the like-
lihood of pretrial misconduct.
189 NATIONAL BuREAu OF STANDARDS, TECHNICAL NOTE 535: COMPILATION
AND USE OF CRIMINAL COURT DATA IN RELATION TO PRE-TRIAL RELEASE OF DE-
FENDANTS 135 (1970).
180 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
161 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3142(e), 3142(0(1) (West 1985).
182 See BJS STUDY, supra note 135, at 4.
'13 Thirty-five percent of all defendants with "serious records," and 20% of those
with "less serious records," were arrested for a new crime or failed to appear for a
court date during a 120-day bail period. See id.
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release was only 0.14."" While these figures do not represent a com-
plete analysis of the factors upon which the first presumption of section
3142(e) arises, they indicate that there is no constitutionally sufficient
connection between the facts that give rise to the presumption and the
ultimate fact of dangerouspess 65
It thus appears that without carefully scrutinizing the available
information on the subject, Congress created two presumptions in the
Bail Reform Act that simply are not supported by the available data. In
the words of the Court in Leary, "it [is] no more than speculation" 66
to say, upon a showing of the facts specified in the Bail Reform Act,
that a person is likely to pose a danger to the community if released
prior to trial.
CONCLUSION
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 has fundamentally changed the ad-
ministration of bail in the federal criminal justice system by allowing
for pretrial detention of accused persons who are deemed too dangerous
to be released. The presumptions of section 3142(e) of the Bail Reform
Act impinge on the determination of dangerousness by shifting to the
accused at least the burden of production, and quite possibly shifting
the burden of persuasion as well. The Constitution places affirmative
limits on the use of presumptive devices that shift the burden of proof
in this way. The standards developed for assessing whether the use of
presumptions violate the accused's right to due process of law clearly
show that the use of these presumptions is unconstitutional.
The presumptions of the Bail Reform Act require the accused to
prove the existence of a fact that, in effect, cannot be proved. If persons
who have not been convicted of the crime charged are to suffer the
severe deprivation of liberty and stigmatization caused by detention
prior to trial, then the Constitution requires that this deprivation be
based on a reasoned and thorough investigation of the factors involved,
rather than on the unsubstantiated beliefs of a well-intentioned
legislature.
14 See Preuentive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, supra note 156, at 392. For
"dangerous crimes" the correlation was 0.22. See id. A perfect correlation is 1.0, 0.0
indicates that there is no relationship, and -1.0 indicates a perfect inverse relationship.
165 In United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1985), the court presented
some evidence on the risk of flight of defendants accused of drug offenses, see id. at
395-98 app., but did not present any evidence dealing with dangerousness.
16 395 U.S. at 52.
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